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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
JASON WOODS and 
CHARLES DION, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 960269-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendants appeal an interlocutory order denying their motion to suppress 
evidence (R. 77-80). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-
3(2)(d) (1996) and Utah R. App. P. 5 (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The State has consolidated defendants' first four issues into two to more closely 
conform to the analysis prescribed under Terry v. OhioT 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968), 
namely: (1) Was the police officer's action "justified at its inception"? and (2) Was the 
resulting detention "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
interference in the first place"? The factual issue defendants raised as Point 5 will be 
addressed separately: 
1. Was the deputy constitutionally justified in stopping defendants' car incident 
to a traffic violation committed in his presence? 
2. Did the deputy have probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of 
defendants' car when the deputy smelled raw marijuana during his initial contact with 
defendants as a result of the traffic stop? 
3. Was the trial court's finding of fact that the deputy was in a position to detect 
the odor of marijuana clearly erroneous? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews a trial court's factual determination of whether a traffic 
violation was committed in an officer's presence, and other factual findings, for clear 
error. State v. Spurgeon. 904 P.2d 220, 224 (Utah App. 1995) (citing State v. 
Delaney. 869 P.2d 4, 6-7 (Utah App. 1994)). This Court reviews a trial court's 
determination of whether a particular set of facts constitutes probable cause 
nondeferentially for correctness, affording a measure of discretion to the trial court. 
I$L at 225 (citing State V, PpQle, 871 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah 1994) (citing State v. Pena. 
869 P.2d 932, 935, 939 n.5 (Utah 1994))). 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. §§41-3-105(8)(a) and (b) (1995): 
[P]eace officers shall: 
(a) make arrests upon view and without warrant for any violation 
committed in their presence of any of the provisions of this chapter, or 
Title 41, Chapter la, Motor Vehicle Act. 
(b) when on duty, upon reasonable belief that a motor vehicle . . . 
is being operated in violation of any provision of Title 41, Chapter la, 
Motor Vehicle Act, require the driver of the vehicle to stop, exhibit his 
driver's license and the registration card issued for the vehicle and submit 
to an inspection of the vehicle, the license plates, and registration 
card. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-61(1) (1995): 
On a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for 
traffic the following provisions apply: 
(1) A vehicle shall be operated as nearly as practical entirely within 
a single lane and may not be moved from the lane until the operator has 
determined the movement can be made safely. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1995): 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has 
a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants were charged in an information with possession of a controlled 
substance (marijuana) in an amount exceeding one hundred pounds, a second degree 
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felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(l) and (2)(b)(l) (1995) (R. 1-2). 
During their preliminary hearing (R. 17, 115-61) and, pursuant to a written motion (R. 
20-22), at a subsequent suppression hearing (R. 57-58, 162-242), defendants sought to 
suppress the results of a warrantless search of their rental car (viz., 210 pounds of 
marijuana) (see 171-72). The trial court denied their motion (R. 70-74, 77-80), and 
this Court granted their petition for interlocutory appeal on June 5, 1996 . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
An appellate court views the evidence "in the light most favorable to the trial 
court's ruling on the suppression motion." Sandy Citv v. Thorsness. 778 P.2d 1011, 
1012 (Utah App. 1989). The trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
order (R. 77-80) are attached (appendix A). 
At approximately 6:45 a.m. on June 8, 1995, defendant Dion was driving and 
defendant Woods was a passenger in a rental car traveling eastbound on Interstate 70 (I-
70) about 10 miles west of Salinas, Utah (R. 119-20, 123, 169; 212). From nearly a 
mile away, as they came down a gradual slope, defendant Dion saw a marked patrol car 
parked in the median facing him (R. 194-95; 224-25; Exhibit 51). 
1
 Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 11(h), the parties stipulated that a videotape of 
the traffic stop, offered as Exhibit 5 at the January 9, 1996 suppression hearing, be 
appended to the record on appeal. The topography and conditions described are clear 
from viewing the videotape. 
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Sevier County Deputy Sheriff Phil Barney was in the patrol car. Deputy Barney 
(the deputy) has been a police officer for nearly 30 years, and has patrolled traffic on I-
70 for over 20 years (R. 124-25, 168, 176-77). Because 80-90% of all traffic accidents 
on that stretch of road (the main route between Los Angeles and Denver) are one-car 
accidents caused by a sleepy or intoxicated driver, his greatest concern is to watch for 
drivers who may be sleepy or intoxicated (R. 137, 168-69). He sees the most tired 
drivers in the early morning, and sees intoxicated drivers throughout the day (R. 185-
86). He most commonly stops people for weaving or erratic driving (R. 169). 
On June 8, 1995, the deputy went on duty just before 6:00 a.m. (R. 123-24). 
There were no Highway Patrol troopers on duty in Sevier County that morning (R. 
124). He parked bis marked patrol car facing west in the median of 1-70 near milepost 
48 (R. 197). He was operating a radar gun to track the oncoming (eastbound) traffic 
(R. 120, 125-26, 169, 188-89). At about 6:50 a.m., he watched defendants' car 
approaching (R. 120, 169). As it got closer, and began straightening out from a slight 
right-hand curve, the deputy observed the car drive over the center line from the right 
lane about a foot and then back Q$L; R. 128, 195). Lane-straddling is a traffic 
violation. Utah Code Ann. §46-6-61(1) (1987). The deputy waited until defendants' 
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car passed, then turned his patrol car around, activated his overhead lights and pulled 
defendants' car over (R. 120, 170, 199-200).2 
When he approached the stopped car and spoke with defendant Dion (the driver) 
through the car window, the deputy smelled a mixture of vanilla air freshener, "Cling 
Free" laundry sheets, and raw marijuana (R. 121, 130, 134-36, 170, 203-04). The 
deputy is experienced in detecting the smell of marijuana, and also knew that drivers 
transporting drugs often use air fresheners and "Cling Free" laundry sheets to try to 
mask the odor (R. 121, 136, 206). When he smelled the marijuana during his initial 
contact with defendants, the deputy decided he was going to search the car (R. 131, 
208, 215). He also quickly determined that defendant Dion (the driver) was not sleepy 
or impaired (R. 137-38). Nevertheless, he first returned to his patrol car and ran a 
warrants check through his dispatcher to find out if defendant Dion might pose a threat 
to his safety (R. 131-32, 207-08). The warrants check took approximately three 
minutes (see Exhibit 5; from 06:52:45 to 06:55:45).3 After discussing with defendant 
Dion where the car had been rented, and while handing back his drivers license and 
registration, the deputy asked, "Are you - you're not transporting anything illegal?" 
(Exhibit 5, at 06:56:31). Defendant Dion replied, "Oh no. Oh no." (Exhibit 5, at 
2
 When the deputy activated his overhead lights, a video camera automatically 
began recording (R. 123; s££ Exhibit 5, appended to the record by separate stipulation). 
3
 The times are recorded on the video itself. 
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06:56:32). As he bent down, the deputy then asked, "Would you mind opening the 
trunk?" (Exhibit 5, at 06:56:34). Defendant Dion replied, "I - 1 don't think I can do 
that." (Exhibit 5, at 06:56:39). The deputy responded, "You don't think you can?", 
to which defendant Dion replied, "No." (Exhibit 5, at 06:56:43). The deputy then 
opened the driver's side door and advised defendants Dion and Woods to "step out" 
and stand behind the car (R. 171; Exhibit 5, 06:56:44). 
The deputy searched first in the passenger compartment, to ensure there were no 
weapons, and found a newly opened vanilla air freshener (R. 143-45, 171, 203-05, 
207-08). The defendants had bought three or four air fresheners "to cover up the smell 
[of the marijuana]." (R. 228-30) They put one of the air fresheners in the passenger 
compartment, but moved it into the glove box when the deputy started to pull them over 
(R. 230-31), and that's where the deputy found it (R. 228-29). They put the other air 
fresheners and "Cling Free" laundry sheets in the trunk with the marijuana to try to 
cover up the smell (R. 228, 232; &££ also. R. 135). 
After searching the passenger compartment, the deputy opened the trunk from a 
switch inside the car (Exhibit 5, at 06:58:40). Without opening to examine them or 
leaning down to smell them, the deputy briefly patted the exterior of four cloth travel 
bags in the trunk, and then told the defendants to kneel down with their hands behind 
their heads while he called for backup (Exhibit 5, from 06:58:40 to 06:58:55). The 
deputy returned from the patrol car after calling his dispatcher and told the defendants 
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that while they were waiting, they should think about whether they wanted to cooperate 
since, "It's obvious what you got." (Exhibit 5, 07:00:48). The deputy also told the 
defendants, "There's not enough perfume, car freshener, whatever, made that you can 
cover the smell of that after you've had it in the car for a day or so." (Exhibit 5, from 
07:04:12 to 07:04:27). 
Two Richfield City policemen arrived at approximately 7:09 a.m., and the 
defendants were transported for booking into jail (R. 132-33, 208-10; Exhibit 5, at 
07:09:00). While they were being transported, defendant Dion asked why they had 
been pulled over (Exhibit 5, at 7:22:10). The deputy replied that, "as you came around 
the turn there you were across this line and I don't know whether you'd driven all night 
and didn't sleep." (Exhibit 5, at 7:22:15). 
It was just over 30 minutes from the initial traffic stop until the defendants 
arrived for booking (Exhibit 5, from 06:52:00 to 07:26:59). The marijuana taken from 
four cloth traveling bags in the trunk of defendants' car was in 30 bundles weighing a 
total of 210 pounds (R. 121, 171-72). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The deputy was constitutionally justified in stopping defendants'car 
incident to a traffic violation committed in his presence. A police officer is 
constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle after observing a traffic violation. The 
deputy observed defendants' car driving over the centerline and back. Lane-straddling 
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is a traffic violation. Therefore, the deputy was constitutionally justified in stopping 
defendants' car. 
2. The deputy had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of 
defendants' car when he smelled raw marijuana during his initial contact with 
defendants as a result of the traffic stop. It is well settled that the odor of marijuana 
emanating from a vehicle establishes probable cause for the warrantless search of that 
vehicle. Therefore, when the deputy smelled raw marijuana during his initial contact 
with defendants as the result of the traffic stop, he had probable cause to search their 
car and to detain them while he did so. Although defendants have not attacked whether 
there were exigent circumstances, the trial court also found that a search without a 
warrant was justified because the vehicle was movable and the occupants alerted. 
3. The trial court's finding of fact that the deputy was in a position to 
detect the odor of marijuana was not clearly erroneous. The trial court, as fact 
finder, is in the best position to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility. The 
deputy's testimony that defendants' car "reeked of marijuana'' and that he did not need 
to lean down to smell it was supported by the videotape of the traffic stop: after 
opening the trunk and briefly patting the exterior of four cloth traveling bags, the 
deputy told defendants to kneel down and put their hands behind their heads; he later 
told them, "It's obvious what you got" and "There's not enough perfume, car 
freshener, whatever, made that you can cover the smell of that after you've had it in the 
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car for a day or so." Therefore, the trial court's finding that the deputy smelled 
marijuana during his initial contact with defendants was not clearly erroneous. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE DEPUTY WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY JUSTIFIED IN 
STOPPING DEFENDANTS' CAR INCIDENT TO A TRAFFIC 
VIOLATION COMMITTED IN HIS PRESENCE 
Defendants contend that if their car went over the centerline, it was only for a 
moment (Def. Br. at 8, paragraphs 2 and 8, "Statement of Facts"; Def. Br. at 18, 23).4 
Defendants argue, in any event, that the deputy stopped them on a pretext and that a 
reasonable officer would not have stopped them because any traffic violation was minor 
(Def. Br. at 18-28). Finally, defendants argue that the stop was not justified under 
"community caretaker" principles (Def. Br. at 28-32). 
The State's position is simple: The deputy was "constitutionally justified in 
stopping [defendants'] vehicle" because "the stop [was] 'incident to a traffic violation 
committed in [his] presence.'" State v. Spurgeon. 904 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah App. 1995) 
(quoting State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Talbot. 
792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App. 1990); S£s alsfi United States v. Cummins. 920 F.2d 
4
 Defendants have not expressly challenged as clearly erroneous the trial court's 
factual findings that the deputy observed their car cross over the centerline, and that 
this was a traffic violation (R. 77-78; cL Def. Br. at 36-37; see. Spurgeon. 904 P.2d at 
224). 
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498, 500 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that "[w]hen an officer observes a traffic offense-
however minor-he has probable cause to stop the driver of the vehicle."). The pretext 
doctrine defendants invoke has been rejected, as applied to traffic stops, by the 
Supreme Court in Whren v. United States. 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996), by the Tenth Circuit 
Court in United States v. Botero-Ospina. 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc), and 
by the Utah supreme court in State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994). 
Additionally, the "community caretaker" principles set forth in Provo City v. 
Warden. 844 P.2d 360 (Ct. App.), affrl, 875 P.2d 557 (Utah 1994), were not raised by 
defendants below. Issues not raised before the trial court are usually waived and cannot 
be raised for the first time on appeal. See State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781, 783-84 
(Utah 1992); State v. Matsamas. 808 P.2d 1048, 1052-53 (Utah 1991); Utah R.Evid. 
103(a); cL Botero-Ospina. 71 F.3d at 787 n.4. In any event, to resolve this case the 
Court need not go beyond the clear rule regarding stops for traffic violations articulated 
inSpuigfiOn, 904P.2dat225. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects "the right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const, amend. IV. The right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures extends to a person's automobile. Delaware 
v. Prouse. 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396 (1979); see 2lSQ State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132, 
1135 (Utah 1989) ("Although a person has a lesser expectation of privacy in a car than 
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in his or her home, one does not lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment while in 
an automobile.") The Fourth Amendment is "implicated . . . because stopping an 
automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' . . . even though the 
purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." Prouse. 99 S.Ct. 
at 1396. "Thus, the Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers from randomly or 
arbitrarily stopping vehicles on the highway." State v. Lopez. 831 P.2d 1040, 1043 
(Utah App. 1992) (citing Enaisfe, 99 S.Ct. at 1396-98), vacated and remanded on other 
grounds. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994). The initial inquiry is whether a stop is "justified 
at its inception." Terry. 88 S.Ct.at 1879. 
It is well settled that "[a] police officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a 
vehicle if the stop is 'incident to a traffic violation committed in [his] presence.'" 
Spurgeon. 904 P.2d at 225 (cases omitted). "[TJt is irrelevant what else the officer 
knew or suspected about the traffic violator at the time of the stop. It is also irrelevant 
whether the stop in question is sufficiently ordinary or routine according to the general 
practice of the police department or the particular officer making the stop." Lopez. 
873 P.2d at 1140 (citing United States v. Ferguson. 8 F.3d 385, 391 (6th Cir. 1993)). 
The "sole inquiry is whether this particular officer had reasonable suspicion that this 
particular motorist violated 'any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and 
equipment regulations' of the jurisdiction." Botero-Ospina. 71 F.3d at 787 (quoting 
Delaware v. Prouse. 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1400 (1979)). 
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In this case, the deputy observed defendants' car cross the center line, briefly 
straddle it, and then return to its lane (R. 120, 128, 169, 195). This was a violation of 
Utah Code Ann. 46-6-61(1) (1987).5 Therefore, the stop was justified at its inception 
because the deputy observed a traffic violation. Spurgeon. 904 P.2d at 225; sss. also. 
Utah Code Ann. §§41-3-105(8)(a) and (b) (1992); 77-7-15 (1980). 
Indeed, this case is nearly on all fours with the facts in the Tenth Circuit case of 
Botero-Qspma: 
On March 9, 1993, Carlos Botero-Ospina was traveling eastbound 
on Interstate 70 just east of Salina, Utah. Deputy Phil Barney, of the 
Sevier County Sheriffs Department, was traveling westbound in his 
patrol car when he observed Mr. Botero-Ospina's vehicle swerve from the 
outside lane, straddle the center line, and swerve back to the outside lane. 
Deputy Barney testified at the suppression hearing that along this 
particular stretch of highway, midway between Los Angeles and Denver, 
drivers frequently experience fatigue. [Record citation omitted]. Thus, he 
decided to stop the vehicle to ensure that the driver was not falling asleep 
or driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. . . . 
. . . Deputy Barney's stop of Mr. Botero-Ospina's vehicle was 
proper. He observed a violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-61 relating to 
lane straddling. Furthermore, he was able to articulate specific facts 
which, in light of his training and experience, gave rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that Mr. Botero-Ospina may have been driving under the 
influence of a l c o h o l . . . . For either or both of these reasons, Deputy 
Barney was fully warranted in stopping Mr. Botero-Ospina. It is 
irrelevant whether a reasonable officer would have stopped Mr. Botero-
Ospina under these circumstances. It is likewise irrelevant that Deputy 
Barney may have harbored a secret hope of finding evidence of drug 
trafficking. Because the deputy had reasonable articulable suspicion that a 
traffic violation had occurred or was occurring, the stop did not violate 
5
 See n.4 above. 
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the Fourth Amendment and we need inquire no further into the 
circumstances surrounding the stop. 
LL at 785, 788. 
In contrast, State v. Bello. 871 P.2d 584 (Utah App.), cert.denied, 883 P.2d 
1359 (Utah 1994), and United States v. Lvons. 7 F.3d 971 (10th Cir. 1993), relied on 
by defendants, can be distinguished on their facts. 
In Bello. this Court was unwilling to find a traffic violation because it concluded 
that Bello's high-profile camper could have been moved out of its lane by extremely 
high winds (LL at 587). In this case, defendants were driving in a low-profile sedan on 
a clear day where there was at most "a very slight breeze" (R. 217, 224; Exhibit 5). 
Indeed, the trial court specifically found that there was "no wind, the sky was clear and 
the road was dry." (R. 77; "Findings of Fact," paragraph 2., appendix A). 
In Lyons, the Tenth Circuit Court was unwilling to find a traffic violation where 
the defendant's truck "weaved" but remained in its lane of traffic. In this case, 
defendants' car went over the centerline. £££ Utah Code Ann. 46-6-61(1) (1987). 
The trial court specifically found that the deputy "observed that the driver's side 
wheels of the [defendants'] vehicle were one foot into the left lane of the two-lane 
Interstate highway with the remainder of the vehicle in the right lane when first 
observed" and that he "then saw the vehicle move entirely back into the right lane." 
(R. 77-79; "Findings of Fact," paragraphs 3. and 4., appendix A). The trial court 
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concluded that tt[t]he vehicle was lawfully stopped for investigation related to the traffic 
offense of operating a vehicle outside the designated lane of travel, Section 41-6-61(1), 
Utah Code Annotated, and possible driver impairment." (R. 78-79;"Conclusions of 
Law," paragraph 1., appendix A). The trial court's conclusion was correct. Since the 
deputy observed a traffic violation, the stop was justified at its inception. Terry. 88 
S.Ct. at 1879. 
Point II 
THE DEPUTY HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONDUCT A 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF DEFENDANTS' CAR WHEN HE 
SMELLED RAW MARIJUANA DURING HIS INITIAL CONTACT 
WITH DEFENDANTS AS A RESULT OF THE TRAFFIC STOP 
Defendants argue that they were unlawfully detained after the deputy returned 
defendant Dion's drivers license and then attempted to obtain consent to search (Def. 
Br. at 32-36). 
To the contrary, the deputy had probable cause to detain and search defendants' 
car when he smelled raw marijuana upon his initial contact with them as a result of the 
traffic stop. The brief warrants check was justified for the deputy's personal safety and 
was reasonable under the circumstances. See United States v. Merkley. 988 F.2d 1062 
(10th Cir. 1993) (police officers may take reasonable steps to protect themselves). 
Defendant Dion's subsequent refusal to consent to a search had no effect on what was 
already probable cause to search the car, nor did it mean they were free to leave. 
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Probable cause to search includes the authority to detain. £e_e_ State v. Dudley. 847 
P.2d 424 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Naisbitt. 827 P.2d 969 (Utah App. 1992). 
The trial court found that the deputy smelled raw marijuana when he requested a 
driver's license and registration during his initial contact with defendants (R. 78; 
"Findings of Fact," paragraph 8., appendix A). The trial court specifically concluded 
that, "[t]he officer, upon smelling the odor of marijuana during the investigation, had 
probable cause to search the vehicle." (R. 79; "Conclusions of Law," paragraph 2., 
appendix A). As this Court has noted, "It is well settled that the odor of marijuana 
emanating from a vehicle establishes probable cause for the warrantless search of that 
vehicle." Spuiseon, 904 P.2d at 227 (citing State v. Dudley. 847 P.2d 424, 426-27 
(Utah App. 1993); State v. Naisbitt. 827 P.2d 969, 972-73 (Utah App. 1992). The trial 
court's finding of probable cause was, therefore, correct. When the deputy smelled 
raw marijuana during his initial contact with defendants as the result of the traffic stop, 
he had probable cause to search their car and to detain them while he did so. LL 
A warrantless search of an automobile must be justified by a showing of both 
probable cause and exigent circumstances. State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229, 1236-37 
(Utah 1996). The trial court concluded that "[t]he search was lawfully conducted 
without a warrant inasmuch as the vehicle was movable and the occupants alerted." 
(R. 79; "Conclusions of Law," paragraphs 3., appendix A). In Anderson, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that "exigent circumstances exist when 'the car is movable, the 
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occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant 
must be obtained.'" 910 P.2d at 1237 (quoting State v. Limb. 581 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 
1978) (quoting Chambers v. Maroney. 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1981 (1970))). The trial court's 
conclusion regarding exigent circumstances was likewise correct and, in any event, has 
not been challenged by defendants either before the trial court or on appeal. 
Although contending that they were "unlawfully detained" (Def. Br. at 32), 
defendants have only implicitly challenged the scope of their detention. Nevertheless, 
the entire incident, from the initial traffic stop on a remote stretch of interstate highway 
until defendants arrived at the station for booking, took just over 30 minutes (Exhibit 5, 
from 06:52:00 to 07:26:59). Therefore, the scope and circumstances of defendants' 
detention were reasonable and were directly related to the probable cause that arose 
upon the deputy's initial contact with them as a result of the traffic stop. Terry. 88 
S.Ct. at 1879. 
Point ffl 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF FACT THAT THE DEPUTY 
WAS IN A POSITION TO DETECT THE ODOR OF MARIJUANA 
WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
Defendants argue that the videotape of the traffic stop (Exhibit 5) and "objective 
facts" do not corroborate the immediate detection by the deputy of a strong odor of 
marijuana sufficient to justify a warrantless search of the car (Def. Br. at 36-37). The 
State disagrees. 
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As this Court has written, "The trial court, as fact finder, is in the best position 
to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility." State v. Delanev. 869 P.2d 4, 6-
7 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. Harmon. 854 P.2d 1037, 1040 n.4 (Utah App. 
1993); State V, Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 582 (Utah App.), cert.denied. 860 P.2d 943 
(Utah 1993)). The trial court heard the testimony of the deputy (R. 119-50, 168-219) 
and defendant Dion (R. 219-34), and viewed the videotape of the traffic stop during the 
preliminary hearing, and also during the suppression hearing (R. 139, 201; Exhibit 5). 
The trial court specifically found that, during the deputy's request for driver's license 
and vehicle registration, he "smelled the odor of vanilla, cling free [sic] sheets and raw 
marijuana." (R. 78; "Findings of Fact," paragraph 8., appendix A). The trial court 
also found that the deputy, "through extensive training and experience, has the ability 
to recognize the odor of raw marijuana." QgL; paragraph 9., appendix A). The trial 
court's findings, and the deputy's testimony that defendants' car "reeked of marijuana" 
(R. 171) and that he did not need to lean down to smell it (R. 143), are further 
supported by the videotape (Exhibit 5). 
First, the fact that the deputy did not ask any questions about whether defendant 
Dion was sleepy or impaired supports the deputy's testimony that he immediately 
smelled raw marijuana and the substances defendants used to attempt to mask the odor 
(R. 121, 130, 134-36, 170, 203-04). Based on this "plain smell," the traffic stop 
immediately converted into a probable cause detention for a search (R. 131, 208, 215). 
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Second, after checking defendant Dion's driver's license, running a warrants 
check, and discussing the rental agreement for the car, the deputy asked if defendants 
were transporting anything illegal, and if defendant Dion would open the trunk (Exhibit 
5, at 06:56:31). Again, this supports the deputy's testimony that, because of the strong 
smell of marijuana, his immediate concern was that defendants were transporting illegal 
drugs (R. 131,208,215). 
Third, after opening the trunk and briefly patting the exterior of four cloth 
traveling bags, the deputy told the defendants to kneel down and put their hands behind 
their heads (R. 171; Exhibit 5, from 06:58:40 to 06:58:55). It is clear that, without so 
much as opening the bags or even opening any of the 30 packages they contained, the 
deputy had confirmed the source of the marijuanB he had smelled. 
Fourth, the deputy told defendants, "It's obvious what you got" (Exhibit 5, 
07:00:48) and "There's not enough perfume, car freshener, whatever, made that you 
can cover the smell of that after you've had it in the car for a day or so" (Exhibit 5, 
from 07:04:12 to 07:04:27). These contemporaneous statements further corroborate 
the deputy's testimony that the marijuana smell was strong. 
Finally, defendant Dion's own testimony at the suppression hearing supported 
the deputy's testimony about the strength of the smell. Defendant Dion testified that 
defendants "had stopped and bought" three or four air fresheners and the "Cling-free" 
laundry sheets to "cover up the smell" (R. 229, 232), that they had an air freshener 
19 
open in the passenger compartment "to get full effect" (R. 230-31), and that they had 
hidden it in the glove compartment when the deputy began to pull them over (R. 231). 
Defendant Dion's subsequent testimony that "We felt that there wasn't [a fairly 
strong odor of marijuana in that car]" (R. 230), that defendants bought the air 
fresheners for "[a]dded precaution" fld.^. and that he did not notice any odor such as 
the "Cling-Free" sheets (R. 231), was obviously self-serving. "[F]rom the trial court's 
findings it is clear that the court rejected [the defendant's] testimony in favor of the 
arresting officer." Delaney. 869 P.2d at 6. 
In summary, based on the evidence before it, the trial court's finding that the 
deputy smelled marijuana during his initial contact with defendants (R. 78) was not 
clearly erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's denial of defendants' motion to suppress should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ?<5A day of November, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
BARNARD N. MADSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed 
by first class mail this Heyday of November, 1996 to Randall Gaither, Attorney for 
Defendants, 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
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Appendix A 
R. Don Brown #0464 
Sevier County Attorney 
Sevier County Justice Complex 
835 East 300 North, Suite 100 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: (801) 896-2675 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
Plaintiff, t CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
vs. : 
JASON G. WOODS, t Case No. 951600158FS 
DOB: 07/25/74 Judge David L. Mower 
CHARLES V. DION, : Case No. 951600159FS 
DOB: 06/12/57 Judge David L. Mower 
Defendants. : 
This matter came on pursuant to Defendants' Motion to Suppress 
Evidence before the Honorable David L. Mower, District Court Judge, on the 9th 
day of January, 1996. The State was represented by R. Don Brown, Sevier 
County Attorney. The Defendants were present and were represented by Randall 
Gaither, Attorney at Law. 
The Court having considered the Defendants' Motion and having heard 
the evidence presented, now enters its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On June 8, 1995, Sevier County Sheriff's Deputy Phil Barney was 
on traffic patrol on Interstate 70 in Sevier County. 
2. The weather conditions were demonstrated no wind, the sky was 
clear and the road was dry. 
3. Deputy Barney observed a Mercury Cougar in which the Defendants 
were traveling in the eastbound portion of the freeway and observed that the 
^-.JW-&_ 
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of Law and Order 
State of Utah vs. Jason D. Woods 
State of Utah vs. Charles V. Dion 
driver's side wheels of the vehicle were one foot into the left lane of the 
two-lane Interstate highway with the remainder of the vehicle in the right 
lane when first observed. 
4. Deputy Barney then saw the vehicle move entirely back into the 
right lane. 
5. The vehicle did not interfere with the operation of any other 
vehicle. 
6. Deputy Barney then made a U-turn, activated his overhead lights, 
caught up with the vehicle after approximately one mile, and stopped the 
vehicle. 
7. Deputy Barney approached the driver side door of the vehicle and 
the driver rolled the window down. 
8. Deputy Barney requested the driver's license and registration 
for the vehicle and, during such request, smelled the odor of vanilla, cling 
free sheets and raw marijuana. 
9. Deputy Barney, through extensive training and experience, has 
the ability to recognize the odor of raw marijuana. 
10. Deputy Barney requested consent to search the vehicle and 
consent was refused. 
11. Deputy Barney ordered the Defendants to exit the vehicle and 
searched the vehicle. 
12. Marijuana weighing 210 pounds was found in the trunk of the 
vehicle. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The vehicle was lawfully stopped for investigation related to 
the traffic offense of operating a vehicle outside the designated lane of 
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travel, Section 41-6-61(1), Utah Code Annotated, and possible driver 
impairment. 
2. The officer, upon smelling the odor of marijuana during the 
investigation, had probable cause to search the vehicle. 
3. The search was lawfully conducted without a warrant inasmuch as 
the vehicle was movable and the occupants alerted. 
O R D E R 
Having entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court 
denies Defendants' Motion to SuppressxEvidence. 
DATED this I day of -ttSTCh, 1996. 
DftVXt) L. MOWER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that an unsigned, full, true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER was 
placed in the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage 
thereon fully prepaid on the «3«2 2 — day of March, 1996, addressed as 
follows J 
Mr. Randall Gaither 
Attorney at Law 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a signed, full, true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER was placed 
in the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-class postage thereon 
fully prepaid on the V ^ day of March, 1996, addressed as follows: 
Mr. Randall Gaither 
Attorney at Law 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
